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CRIMINAL JUSTICE THAT REVIVES REPUBLICAN 
DEMOCRACY 
John Braithwaite 
ABSTRACT—Criminal justice seems an implausible vehicle for reviving 
democracy. Yet democracy is in trouble. It is embattled by money politics 
and populist tyrannies of majorities, of which penal populism is just one 
variant. These pathologies of democracy arise from democracy having 
become too remote from the people. A new democracy is needed that 
creates spaces for direct deliberative engagement and for spaces where 
children learn to become democratic. A major role for restorative justice is 
one way to revive the democratic spirit through creating such spaces. 
AUTHOR—Professor and Founder of the School of Regulation and Global 
Governance (RegNet) at the Australian National University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Democracy is virtuous because it can increase freedom, particularly 
when we conceive freedom as nondomination. Unfortunately, however, 
democracy often reduces freedom and has become more systematically an 
enabler of domination. Domination of women in criminal justice is one 
kind of un-freedom considered in this Essay. Criminal justice, like 
democracy, is systemically dangerous when it increases domination. 
Criminal justice can be reformed to reduce the domination of women and 
men. Reformed republican criminal justice, however, can reduce the 
dominations of criminal justice and reduce the dominations of criminality, 
while advancing liberty through democracy. Indeed, criminal justice is a 
strategic institution for salvaging contemporary corrosion of democracy, 
unleashing the potential of democracy for advancing liberation. Electoral 
populism is the key risk for criminal justice becoming a tyranny of the 
majority. Money politics is the most poisonous risk of electoral democracy 
as it drives up domination instead of freedom.  
One reason the judicial branch is the most hopeful branch for 
renewing the jaded circumstances of democracy is that the judiciary can be 
easier to proof against money politics and populism than the legislative or 
executive branches. Money power is, much more insidiously, the worm in 
the apple of the legislature and executive; the judicial branch can choose to 
use its greater freedom from money politics, power politics, and populist 
politics to better institutionalize freedom and enrich democracy. 
I. DEMOCRACY’S DISAPPOINTMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC HOPES
FOR THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 
Democracy accumulates tarnish in the eyes of the young. Trust in 
democracy and its key institutions has been in decline across all the 
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decades since trust has been measured systematically.1 This is one reason I 
have argued that the project of repairing a jaded democracy in the 
legislative and executive branches of government is a less important project 
than reviving democracy through the judicial branch.2 There are things we 
can do to rescue the legislative and executive branches from subservience 
to money politics and remoteness from the people that are identified here as 
their fundamental problems. Yet no society finds it easy to stop money 
from talking in politics and surveying histories of failures to do so is not 
the topic of this Essay.  
Many political philosophers have argued that democracy is good 
because it advances certain values, as opposed to being good in itself. This 
explains our moderation in the use of democracy. If elections were so good, 
why not hold them annually? Why not provide every citizen a referendum 
app to participate in a citizens’ vote on every question before legislatures? 
The answer is that decision by vote destabilizes in ways that can threaten 
other values, including truth. This is because politicians often win by being 
more adept at lying than their adversary.  
The judicial branch can better enable deliberative democracy than 
other government branches because deliberation is more feasible over finite 
legal issues within the confines of a courtroom or restorative justice circle 
than it is across the many agencies of executive government and the houses 
of legislatures as they choose among a wide range of possible priorities. 
Votes are easier to buy than judicial decisions, and executive governments 
are easier to buy than “not guilty” verdicts. That is why everywhere in the 
world, with the sometime exception of Afghanistan,3 people in opinion 
polls perceive police to be more often corrupt than judges. One reason for 
this is that judges are more sensitive to the professional self-regulation of 
the legal profession than they are to opportunities to make money on the 
side. They understand that their success depends on their reputation within 
the profession more than anything else. This bulwark against judicial 
corruption is reinforced by norms that the full reasoning behind their 
decisions must be made public, in open court or in written decision, as must 
the process by which they reached their decision: who received access to 
the court and who was denied leave to testify—something far less true 
1 See WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al. eds., 1997); OECD,
GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013, at 19–35 (2013). 
2 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 130–34 (2002); 
John Braithwaite, Deliberative Republican Hybridity Through Restorative Justice, 59 RAISONS 
POLITIQUES 33 (2015). 
3 John Braithwaite & Ali Wardak, Crime and War in Afghanistan: Part I: The Hobbesian Solution, 
53 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 179 (2013); Ali Wardak & John Braithwaite, Crime and War in Afghanistan: 
Part II: A Jeffersonian Alternative?, 53 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 197 (2013). 
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among executives and legislators. Judges’ professional reputations are 
vulnerable to panels of their peers on appellate courts finding fault with the 
public account of their reasoning. Finally, in serious criminal law cases in 
common law countries, money power may have to buy twelve jurors, as 
well as a judge. It can be difficult to do both. Judges sometimes become as 
corruptly intoxicated as politicians with accumulating money and power. 
But this happens much more rarely for the foregoing reasons.  
This Essay argues that the problem is not just that money politics 
corrupts democracy. It is that democracy engenders money politics and 
thereby drives up domination, destroying the very freedom of citizens that 
is democracy’s rationale. I argue here that, unfortunately, well-funded 
campaigns to spread lies on social media are just one way that 
contemporary politics has become progressively more sophisticated in its 
openness to corruption by the drive to accumulate money and power. This 
passes to the judicial branch a responsibility to renew the promise of 
democracy for citizens in ways we might not have seen as the judiciary’s 
responsibility in previous centuries.  
II. IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF CYRUS: LEARNING FROM TYRANTS
This Essay defends the republican tradition4 that has roots as early as
the Code of Hammurabi in Babylon and the freeing of slaves, most 
famously the liberation and return to Jerusalem of the Hebrew slaves by 
Cyrus the Great of Persia.5 Thomas Jefferson owned two copies of 
Xenophon’s The Education of Cyrus,6 one heavily annotated in his hand as 
he toiled as a Founder.7 The Roman Empire was, however, the most 
germinal incubator of the kind of contemporary civic republicanism that is 
4 While Antony Duff in his contribution to this special Issue articulates the republican tradition in 
different terms from these (more liberal terms less focused on domination), they are terms that can be 
consistent with the account presented here. 
5 It is important to note that Cyrus not only lifted the domination of many types of slaves captured 
in previous wars; his project was also to afford a decent life of nondomination for underclasses of all 
kinds. So Persepolis came to be built by workers who were paid enough to lift them out of utter poverty, 
with unprecedentedly moderate working hours compared to previous ceremonial capitals. Moreover, 
Cyrus not only freed the Hebrew slaves to return home, he actively assisted with transport for their 
return and provided them resources to help rebuild their ravaged temple in Jerusalem. His project was 
not only a proto-republican one, it was also a proto-restorative project. See SAMUEL WILLARD 
CROMPTON, CYRUS THE GREAT (2008). 
6 XENOPHON, THE EDUCATION OF CYRUS (Wayne Ambler trans., Cornell Univ. Press 2001). 
7 Harrop claims that, in addition to Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, and other 
Founders were familiar with Xenophon’s The Education of Cyrus. Wm. Scott Harrop, Cyrus and 
Jefferson: Did They Speak the Same Language?, PAYVAND (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.payvand.com/
news/13/apr/1111.html [https://perma.cc/2BAF-NPAU]. 
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an intellectual thread through J.G.A. Pocock,8 Quentin Skinner,9 to Philip 
Pettit.10 Pettit conceived freedom as nondomination as the core political 
value, where nondomination was initially conceived in Rome in terms of 
the condition of liberation from slavery. Democracy in this tradition is not 
good in itself; it is constitutive of public value only when it advances 
freedom as nondomination. 
A paradox of the most vibrant developments in institutionalized 
democracy is that these democracies so depend on the creation of widely 
pacified spaces, on what Norbert Elias calls the civilizing process.11 They 
incubate in some of the most genocidal empires the world has seen: 
Cyrus’s ancient Persian empire and Rome even as they razed cities that 
resisted them, like Carthage; the British and French colonial empires, 
which slaughtered Aboriginal populations in continents beyond Australia 
and Africa; and the American empire, built on genocide against indigenous 
people and grown on the back of the British slave trade.  
One reason it is important to see this paradox sharply is that, as in the 
time of Cyrus, it remains important today to see how we can learn to better 
democratize justice from countries like Iran whose regimes have some 
tyrannical features. It is important for feminists to be open to considering 
that we can learn things we cannot learn in the West about how to advance 
the liberation of women by observing male-dominated tribal jirgas in the 
Pashtun lands of Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan.12 Yet, there is a 
profound reluctance to learn feminist or democratic lessons from such 
contexts. Between 1978 and 1992, the Communist regime in Afghanistan 
accomplished much more equality between men and women than our 
NATO invasion has accomplished this century.13 Despite Laura Bush’s 
pitch that an invasion of Afghanistan would liberate women, by 2014 
Afghanistan ranked 101st out of 102 countries on the OECD Development 
8 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). 
9 QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998). 
10 PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997). 
11 NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: SOCIOGENETIC AND PSYCHOGENETIC 
INVESTIGATIONS (rev. ed. 2000). 
12 Jirgas are traditional Pashtun deliberative circles for settling disputes, as discussed in John 
Braithwaite & Ali Gohar, Restorative Justice, Policing and Insurgency: Learning from Pakistan, 
48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531 (2014); Braithwaite & Wardak, supra note 3; Wardak & Braithwaite, supra 
note 3. 
13 Stephen Gowans, Women’s Rights in Afghanistan, WHAT’S LEFT (Aug. 9, 2010, 10:27 PM), 
https://gowans.wordpress.com/2010/08/09/women%E2%80%99s-rights-in-afghanistan/ 
[https://perma.cc/K5JF-FUH6]. 
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Centre’s Social Institutions and Gender Index.14 Indeed, we must question 
the entire narrative of feminist advance as occurring in two major waves, 
one starting in the late nineteenth century that resulted in votes for women, 
the second flowing from the pens of great feminist writers and activists 
from the 1970s.  
Afghanistan is not unique. Between the two waves of the Western 
narrative, Soviet and Maoist Communism were doing more to equalize 
educational, workplace, judicial, and participatory rights for men and 
women15 than the West.16 Communist women even came to break through 
capitalist glass ceilings more than women from the capitalist world: by 
2011, half of the fourteen billionaires on Forbes’ list of the world’s richest 
self-made women were from mainland China.17 Comparatively greater 
women’s equality is more present at some peripheries of late Communist 
empires, such as Nepalese Maoism,18 than at its cores in Russia and China. 
Most provocatively, some Mongolian feminists advance a revisionist 
narrative of the most genocidal ruler in human history (in terms of the 
proportion of the world’s population he slaughtered), Genghis Khan.19 They 
see him as opening spaces for women’s participation in the rule of history’s 
largest empire; Genghis Khan as an incipient feminist who suffered a “bad 
press” in the West. It is hard to judge if these claims are exaggerated, but 
they do help make the point that it is a grave error to discount what we can 
learn about democracy and nondomination from societies that are less 
democratic or decent than our own. This is especially so when many of the 
most noble accomplishments of our own democracy were forged by 
14 Gender Equality in Afghanistan, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GENDER INDEX (2016),
http://www.genderindex.org/country/afghanistan [https://perma.cc/68S9-WXLD]. 
15 They were also institutionalizing reforms like the abolition of brideprice (buying brides). 
16 This is even true today in a Communist society like Cuba where 49% of seats in the national 
legislature are held by women, higher than for all Western capitalist societies, according to the World 
Bank. Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS [https://perma.cc/MT3U-9ZRU]. 
17 That remained the case in the 2016 ranking: the two richest women were mainland Chinese, with 
a big gap having opened up between them and better-known Western entries like Oprah Winfrey and 
Guiliana Benetton. This gap exists because the Chinese accomplishments were in core capitalist 
industries like information technology, as opposed to accomplishments in entertainment and fashion 
among some Western entries. See The Richest Self Made Women in the World 2016, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/heik45id/zhou-qunfei/#6c1104ce3506 [https://perma.cc/ND8Q-NFES]. 
18 John Braithwaite, Gender, Class, Resilient Power: Nepal Lessons in Transformation (RegNet 
Research Paper No. 92, 2015), http://johnbraithwaite.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2015_Gender-
Class-Resilient-Power.pdf [https://perma.cc/BVS3-2NUJ]. 
19 JACK WEATHERFORD, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE MONGOL QUEENS: HOW THE DAUGHTERS
OF GENGHIS KHAN RESCUED HIS EMPIRE (2010). I am grateful to ANU colleague Narantuya Ganbat, 
whose grandmother was one of the most influential women in the history of the Mongolian Communist 
Party, for this revisionist Mongolian take on the history of feminism. 
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patriarchal, westward-ho, genocidal slave owners like the great civic 
republican who laid the foundations of the Democratic Party, Thomas 
Jefferson. Likewise, we can learn much about democracy and women’s 
rights from patriarchal justice institutions of Polynesian and Melanesian 
societies across the Pacific, from patriarchal jirgas in Central Asia, and 
from the progressive way Iranian law criminalizes the profound domination 
involved in failures to pay alimony by husbands who walk away from their 
wives and children. If we do not have an attitude of learning from the best 
and worst of both our own society and every other society on the planet, we 
will be poor custodians of democracy’s promise.  
Before hastily concurring that pursuit of democracy is not in itself a 
good thing for liberation from patriarchy, slavery, or any other form of 
domination, the next Part puts more meat on the bones of this hypothesis. 
Westerners who live comfortable lives do not grasp the depth of the crisis 
of democracy globally. This is another imperative for us to shift our gaze 
east and south. Yes, we see the corrosion of public trust in the West. But 
those of us in the peacebuilding community of scholars who work in places 
like the Democratic Republic of Congo almost universally now see a 
deeper pathology of democracy.20 This is more than just the ills in the 
United States of jaded cynicism about the political class and the decency of 
truthful electoral competition. It is a pathology of elections doing more 
harm than good in the very places where, according to our political 
theories, democracy is the imperative remedy.  
III. DEMOCRACY’S DISAPPOINTMENTS AFTER WAR:
THE CASE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
A revealing method for evaluating a theory is to road test it in the 
“most likely case” for its success.21 If the theory fails in the “most likely 
case,” then it probably should be discarded.  
India might be considered a “most likely case” for democracy 
succeeding. There was no other country liberated from colonialism after 
World War II that remained as consistently democratic as India, even in the 
face of division by more multiplex ethnic and religious cleavages than most 
states. India has consistently been by far the largest democracy in the world 
20 The first free multiparty election for forty-six years in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
occurred in 2006. The intention was to withdraw United Nations peacekeepers immediately after the 
election. But unfortunately, the election institutionalized the criminalization of the state into the hands 
of the winning family. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & BINA D’COSTA, CASCADES OF VIOLENCE 
(forthcoming). 
21 Harry Eckstein, Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, VOL. 7: STRATEGIES OF INQUIRY (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds., 1975). 
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even as it was profoundly buffeted by Cold War schisms and held together 
in the most difficult of circumstances. Even compared to the most 
important postcolonial democratic success story of previous centuries—the 
United States—India has not suffered convulsion similar to the American 
Civil War (where almost half the population rejected its democratic 
constitution). India has also sustained a more independent and activist 
judiciary than many Western democracies; its judiciary would never have 
tolerated a Guantanamo Bay. There is a special kind of democracy in the 
reinvigoration of Mahatma Gandhi’s “village republicanism” of Panchayats 
(“assembly of elders”) through the world’s largest anti-poverty program, 
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. It 
operates in 778,000 villages to guarantee 100 days of publicly funded work 
every year, mostly on water conservation projects in rural areas, to the 
poorest people of India.22 One-third of Panchayat members are 
constitutionally mandated to be women, as in the Maoism-led Panchayat 
reforms in Nepal.23 There is also an emergent tradition of Indian criminal 
law concerned with Panchayats as incipient vehicles for a more democratic 
and restorative criminal justice at the village level where most Indians still 
live.24 
Yet, within this “most likely case” for democracy’s success, 
democracy failed to secure freedom in the very circumstances when 
democratic integrity is most needed.25 This is in Jammu and Kashmir, the 
only Indian state that emerged from partition with Pakistan as a majority 
Muslim state. Domination of Muslims in Kashmir by Delhi Hindu elites 
fueled many waves of nonviolent civil disobedience pleading for azadi 
(freedom as the condition of not being a slave) and many waves of civil 
war.26 This is not just a story of democracy as an institution that failed to 
prevent domination in Kashmir when it was most needed; it is one of 
democracy as a cause of domination. 
There has been a total failure of democracy in Jammu and Kashmir 
from early on through rigged elections, corruption, removal of elected 
officials who threatened the perceived interests of the ruling party in Delhi, 
and other blatant strategies to kill democracy.27 In more recent times, India 
22 For discussion of critical accounts of this program, see Braithwaite, supra note 2, at 38–44. 
23 Id. at 38; Braithwaite, supra note 18, at 10–12. 
24 S. Latha & R. Thilagaraj, Restorative Justice in India, 8 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 309 (2013); 
M.Z. KHAN & K. SHARMA, PROFILE OF A NYAYA PANCHAYAT (1982). 
25 BRAITHWAITE & D’COSTA, supra note 20.
26 This began the destabilization of Afghanistan from Kashmir decades ago. Kashmir was the early
birthplace of Islamic terrorism that spread afar. Many South Asian scholars argue that peace cannot be 
secured in Afghanistan without securing peace in Kashmir first. See id. 
27 Id. 
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has found it important to sustain the appearance of democracy by reporting 
key performance indicators (KPIs) valued by the international democracy 
industry. One KPI is the percentage of electors who turn out. Part of the 
contrivance of democracy in Kashmir is reports of high voter turnouts: 
State-backed militias take people at gunpoint to the polling booth to get up 
the turnout percentage and to increase the odds of favored candidates. Then 
the state is able to announce her democracy is working. So democracy 
increases domination.28 
Another informant described an incident in 2008 where the local 
military commander abducted the wife of the village headman to the 
military post. She was kept there all night. People assumed she was being 
raped. The village head banged on the door of the post through the night. In 
the morning his wife was released to him. The military commander asked 
her to say if anyone had harmed her during the night. She said she had not 
been touched. Then the commander told the village head to put aside his 
resistance to getting the village vote out for a favored candidate on election 
day. If he did not, his wife would be picked up again and this time would 
be raped all night by all his men. Democracy increasing domination again.29 
Another Kashmir respondent summarized the situation this way: 
“New Delhi preaches democracy, but on the ground practices 
occupation . . . Control is routed through democratic practices . . . 
Disempowerment through democracy.”30  
A senior bureaucrat said that in some situations, the “village votes 
partly to protect the headman. . . . The military is generally not bothered by 
who wins. They are only interested in the show of it. The army is in power 
regardless of which party governs.”31 Our Kashmiri informants reported 
dismay at the way Western diplomats praise India for high voter turnouts in 
recent Jammu and Kashmir elections. A former senior Indian defense 
official argued that rewards by the military are more important than force 
in getting villages out to vote: “I don’t have a responsibility to give you 
medical care or repair your roads and don’t come asking me to do that if 
you don’t get out and vote.”32 There is a systematic policy of rewarding 
with the bribe of development assistance those villages and headmen that 
are subservient to the appearance of Indian democracy.  
28 Interview 101210, in Srinigar, India (2012) (on file with author). All research interviews have 
been collated and coded for anonymity, unless otherwise requested, and filed in a series of unpublished 
and confidential Kashmir field notes. 
29 John Braithwaite and Bina D’Costa’s Kashmir field notes (on file with author). 
30 Interview 101209, in Srinigar, India (2012) (on file with author). 
31 Interview 101229, in Srinigar, India (2012) (on file with author). 
32 Interview 101208, in New Delhi, India (2012) (on file with author). 
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IV. DEMOCRACY CAUSING DOMINATION ON A WIDE FRONT
If democracy is a sprinkler system that switches off when the flames
of domination flash fiercely, if it fails in a theoretically “most likely case” 
like India, then it may be a dubious political theory. We should not be 
content with diagnoses of the exceptionalism of large cases like India (or 
the United States). Now we turn to a wide variety of less likely cases for 
democratic success, but cases where democracy is unusually important to 
secure by the lights of democratic theory. The largest class of cases where 
democracy seems critically important to build is countries that have 
suffered a major armed conflict. 
At the turn of this century, most peacebuilding scholars believed that 
building democracy was an urgent priority for societies recovering from 
war. The influence of the democratic peace theory was at its height.33 When 
international peacekeepers helped war-torn states secure a peace, returning 
democratic sovereignty to the people from the hands of foreign troops as 
quickly as possible was the objective for democratic reasons but also for 
cost containment. Today that consensus has reversed among peacebuilding 
scholars who believe that from recent cases like Libya to older ones like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, too hurried a rush to elections has caused 
more problems than it has solved.34 As with sudden decolonization, quick 
fix elections allowed populist tyrants to garner votes by sowing ethnic 
division, thereby seizing power in the aftermath of conflict, criminalizing 
the state, and fomenting future coups and civil wars. A high-water mark of 
this folly was the 2003 Bush Administration conceiving regime change in 
Iraq as a way of demonstrating to the entire Middle East how 
democratization could build security and prosperity. It built ISIS instead. 
Likewise, with the nonviolent transition in Egypt after the Arab Spring, 
sequencing an election before renewal of rule of law and a participatory 
constitutional debate was a fatal error. 
The first priority after conflict is not to establish electoral democracy, 
but to build a rule of law. Transitional states are best denied electoral 
democracy until the foundations of the judicial branch of the state are built, 
33 The democratic peace theory is the false belief that democracies have never been to war against 
each other. For a summary of the key works and critiques on the democratic peace theory, see Nils 
Petter Gleditsch, Democracy and Peace, 29 J. PEACE RES. 369 (1992). The idea could be traced to 
Kant’s 1795 contention that when citizens can vote to determine political outcomes, they would not 
vote for war unless their country were under attack. See IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (Lewis 
White Beck trans., Liberal Arts Press 1957) (1795). 
34 The most influential scholarly discussions of these failed democratic transitions to be discussed 
below are PAUL COLLIER, WARS, GUNS, AND VOTES: DEMOCRACY IN DANGEROUS PLACES (2009); 
EDWARD D. MANSFIELD & JACK SNYDER, ELECTING TO FIGHT: WHY EMERGING DEMOCRACIES GO TO 
WAR (2007); ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT (2004). 
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alongside what we might call the regulatory branch (an independent 
electoral commission, an Auditor-General, an Ombudsman, an Anti-
Corruption Commission, an independent Human Rights Commission).  
One purpose of this Essay is to tweak that view by arguing that a 
transitional government of national unity negotiated through a peace 
process and heavily influenced by apolitical technocrats is not really an 
anti-democratic policy preference for two reasons. First, in any 
contemporary society, because of the tragic path of corroded trust that 
electoral democracy has taken, the judicial branch is more important for 
building democracy than the elected legislature in any case. Second, short-
termism in commitment to electoral democracy leads to long-term 
criminalization of the state that crushes long-term democracy in all 
branches of governance.  
My Peacebuilding Compared project35 is coding many variables about 
all major wars since the end of the Cold War. This is one of the coded 
variables: 
Democracy can be a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition 
can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by 
political parties to intimidate voters and opponents. 
For only twelve of the thirty-eight armed conflicts coded so far has 
this factor been coded as unimportant in the onset of armed conflict. Before 
the late twentieth century, before politicians learnt to be as expert as they 
are today in corrupting democracy, this result might have been quite 
different. Peace deals work best when transitions are long and are crafted to 
prevent dominations of democracy.36 Peacebuilding must be an 
accomplishment of networked governance of separations of powers if it is 
to institutionalize the prevention of domination.37 
This is similar to Roland Paris’s conclusion on the limits of a liberal 
peace and on the virtues of institutionalization before liberalism, before 
democracy and markets.38 This is also Mansfield and Snyder’s empirical 
conclusion that when domestic institutions are weak, the process of 
democratization promotes war,39 and that of Paul Collier’s empirical studies 
on the impact of democracy on violence.40 They all conclude that checks 
35 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, PEACEBUILDING COMPARED, JOHNBRAITHWAITE.COM,
http://johnbraithwaite.com/peacebuilding/ [https://perma.cc/DR6J-E9JN]. 
36 The next few paragraphs lean heavily on our forthcoming book, Cascades of Violence. See 
BRAITHWAITE & D’COSTA, supra note 20. 
37 JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., NETWORKED GOVERNANCE OF FREEDOM AND TYRANNY (2012). 
38 PARIS, supra note 34. 
39 MANSFIELD & SNYDER, supra note 34. 
40 COLLIER, supra note 34. 
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and balances in institutions—like the rule of law—help democracies 
prevent civil war.41 However, “[i]t has proved much easier to introduce 
elections than checks and balances.”42 Moreover, “taken together, the 
results on elections and democratization are consistent: if democracy means 
little more than elections, it is damaging to the [good government] reform 
process.”43 The reason is that good government is not the most cost-
effective way of benefiting from power. If you can get away with buying 
elections, corrupting an electoral commission, intimidating or killing 
opponents, scapegoating a minority to cultivate majoritarian support, 
jailing strong opponents for corruption and running against weaker ones, or 
simply miscounting the votes, once in government you can reimburse these 
costs by pillaging the state. Incumbents do this by embezzlement from state 
coffers, favoring cronies and family members with government contracts, 
welcoming foreign investors in proportion to their political donations to the 
regime, and other strategies of state criminalization. If politicians try to win 
elections with good government, their capacity to benefit from power 
plummets. This is because good government means rule of law and checks 
and balances on abuse of power that place limits on their crimes, or even 
prevent them. The best way to accumulate power and cash is to win 
elections by methods that require the winner to misgovern.  
Of course, once in place, constraint by an effective rule of law and 
checks and balances does become a good way to win elections. Ultimately, 
the package of balanced democracy constrained by the rule of law 
conduces to good government and prevents tyranny, civil war, and inter-
state war against other democracies. But unconstrained populist democracy 
has the opposite effect.  
This insight offers a constructive strategy for the international 
community to create a more peaceful world with less domination, less 
criminalization of states, and sustainable democracy. After civil wars that 
tear a country apart, the United Nations can put in place UN transitional 
administrations that are hybrids of local and UN governance where both the 
local and the international install checks and balances. Success at this is 
difficult and a matter of degree, as revealed in the cases we have 
documented for my Peacebuilding Compared work.44 Once networked 
41 See also Håvard Hegre & Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Governance and Conflict Relapse, 59 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 984, 990–91 (2015). 
42 COLLIER, supra note 34, at 44. 
43 Id. at 45. 
44 Examples are UN transitional governance in Timor-Leste and transitional governance hybrids 
with regional organizations of states in Bougainville and Solomon Islands as discussed in 
BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 37. 
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republican institutions take root, pillaging the state through bad 
government becomes a way to lose elections. Opposition political parties 
then acquire enough clout—with support from the separation of powers, 
from a semi-autonomous legal profession, accounting profession, civil 
service, and vibrant civil society—to protect the established checks and 
balances against political leaders who seek advantage by eroding them. The 
difficult part is the transition to path dependency upon a polity with checks 
and balances. Semi-democracies that are in transition to fully rounded 
democracy are fragile and vulnerable to tyrants who turn them back to 
autocracy. Restorative justice can help in post-conflict situations, but it is 
no panacea.45 Even so, the fact that restorative justice can help builds a 
bridge between our foregoing pessimistic analysis of depending too heavily 
on elections and our optimistic analysis in the remainder of the Essay of the 
possibilities for energizing democratic reform in the judicial branch. 
V. GROWING DEMOCRACY IN THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
So far, this Essay has argued that in building new democracies, the 
first priority is to lay foundations, a freedom-enhancing constitutional 
settlement, an independent judiciary, and a prosecution service that can 
enforce the rulings of an independent electoral commission. With 
established democracies, the priority is not to have more democracy46 in the 
legislative branch, but to strengthen checks and balances against corrosion 
of its integrity.  
Instead, this Part argues for more democracy in the administration of 
the rule of law. Restorative justice47 is advanced as a practical means of 
giving citizens some meaningful democratic empowerment over matters 
they care about and care to participate in. Restorative justice now has four 
decades of road testing. It has been more thoroughly researched than other 
innovations in the judicial branch during this period. The empirical record 
is that while the majority of citizens in all countries where research of this 
kind has been conducted are deeply dissatisfied with their electoral 
democracy, the majority of citizens—almost always more than 80% of 
45 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., RECONCILIATION AND ARCHITECTURES OF COMMITMENT:
SEQUENCING PEACE IN BOUGAINVILLE (2010); Braithwaite & Gohar, supra note 12; Braithwaite & 
Wardak, supra note 3; Wardak & Braithwaite, supra note 3. 
46 Such as more frequent elections or more referendums on more issues. 
47 Restorative justice is conceived here as a process where all the stakeholders in an injustice have 
an opportunity to discuss who has been hurt, and what might be done to repair that harm and meet the 
needs of all stakeholders. It is a relational justice process. At the level of values, healing and 
empowerment are fundamental. Because crime hurts, justice should heal, and those harmed should have 
a say in how that healing should happen. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1520 
them—are satisfied with restorative justice that they have experienced.48 If 
they are victims of crime, they also feel safer after restorative justice.49 
They experience reductions in post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms50 
and feel less vengeful.51 All kinds of participants feel their rights are more 
respected than in alternative modalities of justice (such as a court hearings); 
restorative justice is better in terms of discrimination based on race, sex, or 
religion; and that restorative justice is fairer and more likely to reduce 
crime.52 Generally, these participants seem to be correct in these beliefs—
although the impact of restorative justice in reducing crime on its own, 
while well-established now, is modest.53 Moreover, while democratized 
justice on average has all these benefits, many individual victims and 
offenders are worse off after restorative justice. That is, while the 
evaluations show that variables like victim anger are lower after restorative 
justice as a statistical average, we do commonly see individual cases where 
the way the offender or the police behave in a conference leaves them 
much angrier than they would have been had a restorative conference never 
occurred.  
There are reasons for hope that the right sort of combination of 
restorative justice and formal litigated justice might be more effective in 
crime reduction than restorative justice on its own.54 But our empirical 
understanding of how productive synergies form between formal justice 
and restorative justice is still immature. While the evidence demonstrates 
that restorative justice is systematically less punitive than courtroom 
justice,55 penal populism poses a danger to all forms of justice becoming 
tools of domination. Hence, the most interesting challenge for restorative 
justice is how to integrate it with judicial justice so that courts can check 
penal populism within restorative justice, and vice versa.  
48 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 47–51. 
49 Id. at 51–52. 
50 Caroline M. Angel et al., Short-Term Effects of Restorative Justice Conferences on Post-
Traumatic Stress Symptoms Among Robbery and Burglary Victims: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 
10 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 291, 302–03 (2014). 
51 Heather Strang et al., Restorative Justice Conferencing (RJC) Using Face-to-Face Meetings of 
Offenders and Victims: Effects on Offender Recidivism and Victim Satisfaction. A Systematic Review, 
9 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1, 42–43 (2013). 
52 BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 37, at 45–72. 
53 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation: The Question of Evidence 
(RegNet Working Paper No. 51, 2016), http://johnbraithwaite.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
figures-JBdotcom-SSRN_2016_BraithwaiteJ-revised-51.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4KY-8K23]. 
54 Strang et al., supra note 51, at 47. 
55 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 146–50. 
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Restorative justice helps to repair citizens’ concern for the procedural 
justice Tom Tyler discusses.56 Among the many facets of procedural justice 
that predict citizen satisfaction with restorative justice, the most important 
one is the democratic control (participatory process control rather than 
outcome control) of citizens over the justice process.57 Restorative justice 
processes in Canberra provide more equal air time for the voices of women 
than do criminal trials.58 The reason restorative justice is particularly 
important with children—both for minor misdemeanors that occur in 
schools, as well as in the justice system—is not that restorative justice is 
more effective with youth than with adults. Rather, the reason is that 
because people are not born democratic, children must learn to be 
democratic, to be active rather than passive in the face of serious problems, 
and to discuss problems rather than be quiescent.59  
It is best for this learning to occur during childhood, through the ways 
children learn to solve children’s problems, especially domination of 
children by other children. The empirical record is that adult bullies who 
destroy workplace democracy and wider political democracies of the adult 
world learn to get away with bullying at school.60 Schools are where the 
project of protecting democracy from the domination of bullies begins, 
where the mouse race can be redesigned to enable a rat race that does not 
ravage democracy.  
Because most adjudications of criminality concern adolescents and 
young adults, criminal adjudication can substantially contribute to 
continuing the project of educating the young in how to be democratic. 
More than that, older citizens value the opportunity to participate in 
decisionmaking when young people they love jeopardize their futures by 
getting in trouble with the police. Hence, both the motivation to be 
democratic and the need for learning to become democratic peak in the 
criminal law institutions of governance. In old democracies as in new ones, 
criminal law becomes a key institution for renewing the democratic 
character of a society. Salvaged legitimacy for democracy is best advanced 
by giving citizens genuine voice in something they deeply care about—the 
56 Tom Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining the Goals of 
American Policing in the 21st Century, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2017). 
57 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 78. 
58 Id. at 154–58. 
59 See id. at 130–33. 
60 E.g., Jacqueline B. Homel, Does Bullying Others at School Lead to Adult Aggression? The Roles 
of Drinking and University Participation During the Transition to Adulthood, 65 AUSTRALIAN J. 
PSYCH. 98 (2013); Peter K. Smith et al., Victimization in the School and the Workplace: Are There Any 
Links?, 94 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 175 (2003). 
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future of their children, grandchildren, siblings and friends—when they are 
in trouble.  
VI. DEMOCRATICALLY DISMANTLING CRIMINAL LAW’S DOMINATIONS
At the outset, this Essay briefly prioritized minimization of
domination over maximization of democracy by referring to the research of 
republican philosophers.61 There is a stronger case for this framework with 
criminal law compared to other institutions. Braithwaite and Pettit have 
argued that domination is the best way of describing what criminal law 
prevents.62 Rape, murder, assault, robbery, and burglary are acts of 
domination. When the law criminalizes acts that involve no domination—
e.g., consenting sexual behavior between adults, vagrancy, abuse of a judge
being construed as contempt—the law should change and these acts should
be decriminalized. Conversely, Braithwaite and Pettit argue that
domination is the best way of describing what disturbs us about bad
criminal justice. Unfair trials, excessive police use of force, detention
without trial, capital or corporal punishment, and prison terms that exceed
upper sentencing limits are all acts of domination that strike dread into
timorous hearts.
If it is true that domination is the best way of describing what good 
criminal law prevents and what bad criminal law threatens, then 
minimizing domination is a good target for continuous improvement of 
criminal justice institutions. My argument here has simply been that the 
process of pursuing that target will grow democracy and make criminal law 
a seedbed of democracy that equally empowers people of different genders, 
religions, races, and ages.  
CONCLUSION 
More than war from without, crime from within citadels of the state is 
the profound threat to democracy. Preventing criminalization of the state 
helps prevent war; preventing war helps prevent criminalization of the 
state.63 Most of the democratization projects attempted around the world 
collapse through the criminalization of states by elected leaders, often in 
61 Particularly PETTIT, supra note 10. 
62 Actually, Braithwaite and Pettit initially framed republican theory in terms of the maximization 
of dominion (nondomination). But with Braithwaite’s absolute concurrence, Pettit later opted for a 
simpler usage of domination and nondomination. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT 
JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 54–86 (1990). 
63 BRAITHWAITE & D’COSTA, supra note 20. 
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concert with a shadow state of organized or corporate criminals.64 Most 
states get themselves into wars eventually. When they do, opportunities for 
state criminalization peak. At the same time, violence and domination by 
criminal justice systems in all societies, but particularly in criminalized 
states, add greatly to the woes of peoples dominated by corrupted electoral 
democracy.  
A remedy is to conceive the criminal justice system as more than a 
check and balance, more than a protection against crime. Rather, it is a 
frontline institution of struggle for democracy without domination. My 
favorite moments in restorative justice conferences have been where 
mothers have admonished the police for using excessive force in arresting 
their child.65 The virtue in such encounters is more than empowering the 
voice of mothers. It is about mothers educating the police, but more 
importantly their own children, about how to be democratic citizens who 
resist domination. The criminal justice system, more than other institutions, 
can add value to the resilience of democracy, not just to grow democracy, 
but to save it from itself. 
Criminal justice is at the front line of saving democracy after the 
populism of war and during the quietude of peace with domination. Our 
justice institutions can be crafted as engines of democracy-building that 
help our children to learn to be democratic, and that check abuse of power 
by democracy’s enemies within the citadel. The so-called spread of 
democracy around the world is as delusional as the fine phrases about 
freedom in the old Soviet constitution. Much of it is diffusion of 
domination by democracy. There is an important role here for restorative 
justice that injects a deliberative democracy that can work better in the 
micro judicial deliberations of the polity than in legislatures.66  
Robust separations of powers within the criminal justice system itself 
are also important. This means engaging affected citizens with more 
effective self-regulation of judicial abuses, more prosecution of judges for 
corruption, more prosecution of prosecutors by independent anti-corruption 
commissioners, and more impeachment of anti-corruption commissioners 
by human rights commissions. Criminalized states can never be made 
democratic while accountability within the state works only hierarchically. 
If the only remedy to corruption of one guardian is hierarchical 
accountability to a guardian above it, then states will be like fish that rot 
from the head down. Accountability must be organized in a more circular 
64 WILLIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES (1998); WILLIAM RENO,
CORRUPTION AND STATE POLITICS IN SIERRA LEONE (1995). 
65 See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 2, at 164. 
66 Braithwaite, supra note 2. 
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fashion where the separated powers of every accountability institution are 
held to account by other accountability institutions.67 Figure 1 illustrates 
this vision for nonhierarchical restorative accountability in a republican 
polity where all key actors must be accountable to one another68: 
FIGURE 1: FORMAL MODELS OF HIERARCHICAL FIDUCIARY AND REPUBLICAN
CONCEPTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
A critical role for restorative justice is to give direct voice to those 
people who claim to have been adversely affected in the adjudications by 
each of those institutions. Restorative justice can help arrange the chairs in 
many virtuous circles of democratic accountability. Circuits of deliberative 
accountability can be checked by citizens’ voices in the restorative justice 
circle of judicial self-regulation, prosecutorial self-regulation, regulation of 
the judiciary by the prosecution, and vice versa. When democracy is being 
corrupted, citizen participation in restorative justice circles convened by 
judges and prosecutors to regulate the integrity of independent electoral 
commissions is important. Such circuits of deliberative accountability can 
be foundational steps toward democracy’s promise. 
67 John Braithwaite, Accountability and Responsibility Through Restorative Justice, in RETHINKING
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (Michael Dowdle ed., 2006). 
68 Figure 1 was originally produced in John Braithwaite, Institutionalizing Distrust: Enculturating 
Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998). 
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